A Foolish Consistency

© 2017 by Richard J. Eisner

In his famous adage “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,” just what is Emerson attacking? Not, I think, consistency in general, for consistency is essential to truth—necessary, though not sufficient, for it, and central to the search for it: A thinker tests the soundness of his outlook by probing it for inconsistency, which will indicate the presence of error (if two propositions are inconsistent, one of them is false). I believe Emerson is criticizing sequential, as opposed to simultaneous, consistency, as follows.

             Both wise and foolish consistency involve the impetus for agreement among our opinions. The difference lies in the set of opinions with respect to which harmony is sought: in the first (wise), it is the present body, in which our standard is truth, and we discard old notions as we come to see that they conflict with it; whereas, in the second (foolish), it is the series, wherein, to avoid having to admit that we erred, our principle is conformity with our past assertions, and we suppress new ideas at odds with them. In other words, the former strives for the truth, even at the cost of appearing fallible; the latter strives for the appearance of infallibility, even at the cost of the truth . . . and, by thus inhibiting the quest for truth, foolish consistency constricts the mind.